Justice Scalia’s Methodology Of Constitutional Interpretation Just An Excuse
Justice Scalia’s Methodology Of Constitutional Interpretation Is Just An Excuse For His Judicial Activism
In the excerpt below, from the U. S. Supreme Court's opinion in the case of
Heller v. D. C, authored by a notorious judicial activist, Justice Scalia, announces his intention to follow a rule of constitutional construction which dictates that the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they were normally and ordinarily used by ordinary citizens of the founding generation.
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” In interpreting this text, we are guided by the
principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood
by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731
(1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824).
Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic
meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that
would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the
founding generation.
Scalia is mistaken. The meaning of the constitution must be ascertained by the application of such rules of interpretation as were understood and recognized as just and valid, at the time the constitution was framed and adopted. At the time the Constitution was made, the well established common law rules of construction didn't include any rule which dictated that a legal instrument was to be understood according the the normal and ordinary use of words by ordinary citizens of the generation that produced the instrument.
Scalia is an activist. He doesn't want to be bound by the rules of construction as were understood and recognized as just and valid, at the time the constitution was framed and adopted, because they won't produce results that square with his personal views.he wants. So, he digs up some nonsense he found in the dicta of an 1930's judicial opinion.
He does this merely to have a pretext to substitute his personal opinions for the will of the lawmakers at the time they made the Second Amendment, in the name of the normal and ordinary use of words by ordinary citizens.
