Editorial: Obama should embrace McChrystal's Afghanistan plan
There is no easy solution to the Afghanistan conundrum. Not only is there no clear route to victory, it's difficult to define what victory is.
Yet there is a solid definition of defeat: allowing Afghanistan to descend further into chaotic violence so the Taliban can return to power and resume playing host to terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Whatever President Barack Obamadecides, he cannot allow this to happen.The president must decide whether the troop-surge plan by his Afghanistan commander, Gen. StanleyMcChrystal, is more likely to head off such an outcome than the alternative favored by Vice President Joe Biden and others, which is to reduce the U.S. military presence and focus on fighting al-Qaeda.
Make no mistake, this is an exceedingly complex, multilayered problem involving Pakistani nukes, billion-dollar opium-trafficking networks and internecine regional meddling.
Obama cannot turn back the clock on the neglect that occurred after the U.S.-led invasion of 2001; today, he faces a series of bad choices with uncertain prospects. Considering the thousands of lives in the balance, his least bad option is to heed the advice of McChrystal, his hand-picked military adviser, and move quickly to boost American troop levels in Afghanistan.
We do not advocate an open-ended commitment to escalation, but McChrystal's plan deserves a try before the administration turns to other options. Its success or failure could be evident by the time the 2012 presidential campaign begins. American voters may well be the final judges, as they were when they elected Obama last year, knowing his commitment to increasing troop levels in Afghanistan.
Lessons from the past
This newspaper opposed Gen. David Petraeus' 2007 troop-surge strategy in Iraq for reasons similar to those skeptics are using to criticize the McChrystal plan. We were wrong; Petraeus was right. His plan brought surprisingly quick results. The insurgency in Iraq is not completely vanquished, but it is manageable enough that Washington can stick to its 2011 withdrawal commitment.
This is not to suggest American commanders always get it right. In Vietnam, a massive troop buildup and heavy bombing led nowhere. Afghanistan is neither Iraq nor Vietnam, but those wars offer valuable cautionary lessons. The Pentagon's understanding of counterinsurgency warfare is light years ahead of what it was during the Vietnam era.
Military might alone will not stop a guerrilla insurgency, as Vietnam proved. Success in Iraq wasn't solely because of the troop surge but depended heavily on the quiet U.S. effort to bribe and cajole Sunni tribal leaders into abandoning support for the insurgency. Americans would have been outraged, amid the carnage of 2005-06, to learn of plans to pay off and negotiate with the very Sunnis who were ordering attacks on U.S. troops. In the end, though, the strategy paid big dividends.
Increased troop strength did allow the U.S. to provide the crucial security component that Iraqis demanded, while buying time to train Iraqi soldiers and police into their proper security roles. Today's vastly improved security conditions, unimaginable in early 2007, are what allow the U.S. to fulfill its 2011 withdrawal promise.
Cautious but realistic goals
McChrystal, a former head of the Joint Special Operations Command who has directed U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq for seven years, warns that Afghanistan's challenges are more complex than Iraq's and that the administration should not expect identical results. Yet the basic requirements remain the same: Afghans need security before they can join the effort to stabilize their country.
Just as Iraqi security forces were timid and desertions rampant in the early days of the surge, Afghan troops and police today are reluctant because they are outnumbered and outgunned by the Taliban. Building confidence requires a clear demonstration of U.S. and NATO resolve. The Taliban's advance cannot be halted and reversed at existing U.S. troop levels – much less the reduced levels envisioned by Biden.
It's also important to identify less-radical elements within the Taliban. Before the 9/11 attacks, Republican and Democratic administrations had 33 documented conversations with the Taliban leadership. Even today, the Taliban maintains Western news media contacts, suggesting a desire to keep communication lines open. Ask no less a conservative than former Speaker Newt Gingrich whether the approach used with moderate Sunnis in Iraq would work with the Taliban: "That would be your goal, I think, to split them," he said.
The primary goal remains to relentlessly pursue al-Qaeda while putting heavy pressure on the Taliban so its leadership realizes that the insurgents cannot seize power through military force. Wiping them out isn't feasible, but Taliban leaders – especially moderates – must learn that fighting the U.S. entails increasingly painful consequences.
Once that message gets through, prospects will grow for an accommodation with the Taliban, giving Afghans the security and stability they seek.
Weighing the consequences
No one can predict whether McChrystal's plan will work. But it's reasonable to expect an Afghan implosion if U.S. troops withdraw, giving both the Taliban and al-Qaeda a claim of victory and an enormous boost in recruiting power, setting back U.S. anti-terrorism efforts years, if not decades.
Little would remain to block radical elements from sweeping through Afghanistan and Pakistan. They could easily reignite the conflict in Kashmir between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India. A nuclear conflagration is not unthinkable under this scenario, with al-Qaeda moving ever closer to accessing Pakistan's nuclear weaponry.
Leaving U.S. troops at current levels allows the Taliban to continue exploiting Afghanistan's deteriorating conditions. Corruption and massive vote tampering by President Hamid Karzai are adding to Afghan disaffection and hopelessness. The longer Obama waits, the worse it gets.
Biden proposes an end to fighting the Taliban, but that doesn't mean the Taliban will suddenly stop attacking U.S. troops. They will continue, and the mission of fighting al-Qaeda will be undermined as Taliban forces keep advancing.
What McChrystal proposes will be a long, difficult slog. There are other important theaters to be addressed, particularly in Pakistan, and plans must be developed to contend with new threats as they develop. But Afghanistan is the question Obama must address now.
By embracing McChrystal's plan, Obama will hardly wow his liberal supporters or advance his standing as a Nobel peace laureate, but he will increase the chances for security in a country that has known only war and hardship since the Soviet invasion in 1979.
Mr. President, this is a risk worth taking.