Lue C Fur
Evil member
Again, not facts, but opinion from the CATO institute. Mis truths and spin.
There you go talking about yourself again...too funny.
Again, not facts, but opinion from the CATO institute. Mis truths and spin.
Again, not facts, but opinion from the CATO institute. Mis truths and spin.
Peace.
Easy to say, now show me the money.
peace.
Can you support that or is it just your opinion?
Well there were 72,844 pages of regulation under Carter and 75,526 under W. but there were 54,335 under Reagan.
There is a Federal registry of regulations.
edit to add: I am fully aware that is a crude and inaccurate measure I was just having a little fun.
Also if you looked at the full picture with an unbiased view it would be very difficult to blame the alleged deregulation of the mortgage industry. It would also be impossible to honestly claim that the government was just a cheerleader when they required by law under the community reinvestment act that banks make loans to high risk individuals. When you want to worship the state you will find a reason.
Evidence on CRA and the Subprime Crisis
Over the years, the Federal Reserve has prepared two reports for the Congress that provide information on the performance of lending to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods--populations that are the focus of the CRA.[SUP]3[/SUP] These studies found that lending to lower-income individuals and communities has been nearly as profitable and performed similarly to other types of lending done by CRA-covered institutions. Thus, the long-term evidence shows that the CRA has not pushed banks into extending loans that perform out of line with their traditional businesses. Rather, the law has encouraged banks to be aware of lending opportunities in all segments of their local communities as well as to learn how to undertake such lending in a safe and sound manner.
Recently, Federal Reserve staff has undertaken more specific analysis focusing on the potential relationship between the CRA and the current subprime crisis. This analysis was performed for the purpose of assessing claims that the CRA was a principal cause of the current mortgage market difficulties. For this analysis, the staff examined lending activity covering the period that corresponds to the height of the subprime boom.[SUP]4[/SUP]
The research focused on two basic questions. First, we asked what share of originations for subprime loans is related to the CRA. The potential role of the CRA in the subprime crisis could either be large or small, depending on the answer to this question. We found that the loans that are the focus of the CRA represent a very small portion of the subprime lending market, casting considerable doubt on the potential contribution that the law could have made to the subprime mortgage crisis.
Second, we asked how CRA-related subprime loans performed relative to other loans. Once again, the potential role of the CRA could be large or small, depending on the answer to this question. We found that delinquency rates were high in all neighborhood income groups, and that CRA-related subprime loans performed in a comparable manner to other subprime loans; as such, differences in performance between CRA-related subprime lending and other subprime lending cannot lie at the root of recent market turmoil.
In analyzing the available data, we focused on two distinct metrics: loan origination activity and loan performance. With respect to the first question concerning loan originations, we wanted to know which types of lending institutions made higher-priced loans, to whom those loans were made, and in what types of neighborhoods the loans were extended.[SUP]5[/SUP] This analysis allowed us to determine what fraction of subprime lending could be related to the CRA.
Our analysis of the loan data found that about 60 percent of higher-priced loan originations went to middle- or higher-income borrowers or neighborhoods. Such borrowers are not the populations targeted by the CRA. In addition, more than 20 percent of the higher-priced loans were extended to lower-income borrowers or borrowers in lower-income areas by independent nonbank institutions--that is, institutions not covered by the CRA.[SUP]6[/SUP]
Putting together these facts provides a striking result: Only 6 percent of all the higher-priced loans were extended by CRA-covered lenders to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods in their CRA assessment areas, the local geographies that are the primary focus for CRA evaluation purposes. This result undermines the assertion by critics of the potential for a substantial role for the CRA in the subprime crisis. In other words, the very small share of all higher-priced loan originations that can reasonably be attributed to the CRA makes it hard to imagine how this law could have contributed in any meaningful way to the current subprime crisis.
The CRA never "required by law" that banks make loans to high risk individuals, that's a misconception. .
The CRA did not require either by law or by regulation that banks make loans to high risk individuals. That article from CATO claims that they did but it doesn't support that claim with any evidence. If the CRA actually said that it should be pretty easy point it out yet no one seems to be able to.The CRA required by regulation which in my mind is equal to required by law. Banks had to comply with CRA goals to meet regulatory requirements. That's not misconception that is fact. If a bank wanted to do anything that required regulatory requirement they had to prove they were making risky loans.
" In 1995, how-ever, the rules were tightened, so that banks had to show that theyhad actually made the required loans, not that they were simply try-ing to do so. The change had a profound effect. Under the initialrule, banks could turn down applicants who did not have the neces-sary credit resources—such as a significant downpayment or a job—but under the new regulations the onus was put on the banks to finda way to make the loan, even if it did not meet their lending stan-dards. The phrase in the CRA regulations was that banks had to be“flexible or innovative” in their underwriting. From the point of viewof the banks, their lending standards had to be loosened. They hadto show that the mortgages were being made. "
Link
CRA loans were not all subprimes nor did they default at the same rates as subprimes. CRA loans that were subprimes did default at the same rate as subprimes extended by private lenders (non-CRA), but that's the point. Regardless what class of loan they were CRA loans defaulted at the same rates as non CRA loans of the same type. If they were in fact higher risk you would expect them to default at higher rates but that didn't happen.Edit to add: CRA loans were not the same as subprime loans but they did default at about the same rate so I find it difficult that you can blame subprime but not CRA. My take .
The CRA required by regulation which in my mind is equal to required by law. Banks had to comply with CRA goals to meet regulatory requirements. That's not misconception that is fact. If a bank wanted to do anything that required regulatory requirement they had to prove they were making risky loans.
" In 1995, how-ever, the rules were tightened, so that banks had to show that theyhad actually made the required loans, not that they were simply try-ing to do so. The change had a profound effect. Under the initialrule, banks could turn down applicants who did not have the neces-sary credit resources—such as a significant downpayment or a job—but under the new regulations the onus was put on the banks to finda way to make the loan, even if it did not meet their lending stan-dards. The phrase in the CRA regulations was that banks had to be“flexible or innovative” in their underwriting. From the point of viewof the banks, their lending standards had to be loosened. They hadto show that the mortgages were being made. "
Link
Edit to add: CRA loans were not the same as subprime loans but they did default at about the same rate so I find it difficult that you can blame subprime but not CRA. My take .
The CRA did not require either by law or by regulation that banks make loans to high risk individuals. That article from CATO claims that they did but it doesn't support that claim with any evidence.
Thinking back to 1995', I guess my question at this point would be, "with a Congress in solid control by the republicans, why did they not act in 1995' to change this?"
By this, so you mean people buying homes they knew they could not pay for?NO matter what. It all came down to greed. BUSH needed to spark the economy whether falsely or not, and greed took over from there. From the lenders to the realtors, greed took over for common sense. With all the backstops "effectively" removed by BUSH and his advisors in the form of "encouragement", a ginormous disaster was born and we all participated in it.
How many people do you know, that bought homes that couldnt afford them? I know hundreds. Its called my delivery area. People with jobs who could swing an interest only loan for 3 years thinking they were going to flip the house for big bucks and get a bigger house. From 2002 to 2007 some did, after that, those that bought took it up the rear end.
The blame really falls on americans for being such suckers.
Peace.
By this, so you mean people buying homes they knew they could not pay for?